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THE FRAUDULENT CLAIMS RULE 
 
As a common law subject, the development of insurance law depends on the 
happenchance of litigation, which is problematic since insurance disputes rarely end 
in court - consumers prefer the Financial Ombudsman and commercial parties use 
arbitration. This means that two Supreme Court appeals within days of one another 
constitute riches. Both concerned fraud: in one, a lie was used in connection with a 
legitimate claim,
1
 and in the other it was used to increase the settlement paid by the 
insurers.
2
 But these cases also draw attention to the broader issue of the proper 
province of the civil law. 
 
Typically, insurance fraud occurs either when a proposal is made for cover, or, as in 
these cases, when there is a claim.
3
 There is fraud if the claimant knowingly, or 
recklessly, claims for a loss that has not occurred or exaggerates its amount, or 
conceals some circumstance that might provide the insurers with a defence to the 
claim.
4
 The other area of claims fraud is where a third party dishonestly alleges a loss 
suffered as the result of the policyholder’s breach of duty (such as a workplace injury 
or road accident) and this triggers a claim under a liability policy.
5
 Finally, there is the 
situation where the insurers suspect but cannot prove fraud and so agree to settle only 
to discover sometime later sufficient evidence of the fraud.  
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 Insurance is a contract of indemnity, which means the insurers are liable only for 
actual losses. Under the fraudulent claims rule, however, if there has been fraud by 
the policyholder, the insurers can refuse payment of the entire claim, including 
genuine losses,
6
 recoup payments relating to that claim,
7
 terminate the contract and 
retain the premium, although there remains liability for pre-fraud claims.
8
 Fraud will 
also taint the rights of an innocent joint insured.
9
 On the other hand, this rule did not 
apply to a dishonest third party, such as the victim of a workplace or road accident, 
which meant he or she could maintain the claim (nominally against the tortfeasor but 
in practice against the tortfeasor's insurers) for genuine losses. As will be seen later, 
the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, in effect, now extends the rule to such 
claimants.
10
 
 
The scope of the fraudulent claims rule was discussed in Agapitos v Agnew (The 
Aegeon) (No. 1).
11
 Mance LJ, obiter, thought it included the use of a fraudulent 
device, such as a forged receipt, to support a genuine claim. At first instance, Toulson 
J had rejected this extension of the fraudulent claims rule, but Mance LJ disagreed. 
He remarked that, while the principal part of the fraudulent claims rule had been 
settled in the nineteenth century, ‘[t]he proper approach to the use of fraudulent 
devices or means is much freer from authority’,12 and he went on to observe: 
  
Tentatively, I would suggest that the courts should only apply the fraudulent 
claim rule to the use of fraudulent devices or means which would, if believed, 
have tended, objectively but prior to any final determination at trial of the 
parties' rights, to yield a not insignificant improvement in the insured's 
prospects—whether they be prospects of obtaining a settlement, or a better 
settlement, or of winning at trial.
13
 
 
The lie had to be substantial and 'directly be related to and intended to promote the 
claim',
14
 but he did not think it necessary to show that the insurers had relied on the 
fraud.  
 
THE VERSLOOT DREDGING CASE 
 
The fraudulent devices rule made relatively few appearances in the courts in the 
decade after The Aegeon,
15
 until Versloot Dredging BV v HDI-Gerling Industrie 
Versicherung (The DC Merwestone).
16
 Shortly after leaving Klaipeda in Lithuania, 
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water flooded the engine room of the ‘DC Merwestone’, damaging the engine and 
causing losses amounting to €3.214 million. The incident was the result of a 
number of factors: the crew’s negligence in failing to close the sea inlet valve of 
the fire pump and drain the system, after using the hoses to clear ice; the damage 
to the emergency fire system pump casing and filter as a result seawater freezing 
inside them soon after sailing from port; the earlier negligence of contractors, 
who had not sealed the engine room bulkheads after undertaking work in the 
area; and defects in the pumping system which meant it could not cope with the 
ingress of water. The insurers instructed Ince & Co, solicitors, to investigate. Mr 
Chris Kornet, for the owners, developed a theory that the bilge alarm had 
sounded, but the crew did not respond because of the rolling of the ship in heavy 
seas. In a letter dated 21 April, he asserted that this was what occurred. At first 
instance, Popplewell J determined that this was speculation by Kornet, even 
though he genuinely believed it to be plausible. When he wrote the letter no 
members of the crew had given this explanation, and he had no reason to believe 
that any would. His reason for telling the untruth was frustration at the insurers’ 
delay in dealing with the claim. The cause of the flooding was unclear, and he 
thought that attaching blame to the crew would reinforce the claim and speed 
payment. Moreover, he was concerned that uncertainty about the cause might 
lead the insurers to focus on the defective condition of the ship, and that, in turn, 
might lead to blame attaching to the owners, and mean the insurers were not 
liable under the policy terms. Subsequently, in a letter dated 27 July Kornet 
repeated the earlier explanation, but this time he did so in the belief that the 
ship's master had confirmed it.  
As the facts emerged during the trial, it became clear that the lie was irrelevant. 
Popplewell J held the loss had been proximately caused by the ingress of 
seawater through the sea inlet valve during the voyage, which was a peril of the 
seas and, therefore, covered. He also rejected the argument made by the insurers 
that the owners had sent the ship to sea knowing of the defective pumps, which 
would have been a breach of warranty, because he concluded that at the time of 
sailing the owners had not known of the problem. This meant there was a valid 
claim for €3.214 million, but, with manifest reluctance, the judge felt bound by The 
Aegeon to conclude that the insurers were not liable because Kornet's response to the 
solicitor’s questions in the letter of 21 April (but not the July letter) constituted a 
fraudulent device. 
 
By one of those curious coincidences, before his appointment to the bench Popplewell 
J had been counsel in The Aegeon where he argued for the fraudulent devices rule. 
But as a judge he attacked it as visiting 'disproportionately harsh and unjust 
consequences upon an assured in favour of an undeserving insurer.'17 He said of 
Kornet's behaviour, 'In a scale of culpability... this was at the low end.'
18
 It was not 
carefully planned, it was told on one occasion and not repeated at the trial, and it was 
used to support a theory which K genuinely held. Moreover, the crew had been made 
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available to the insurers' solicitor, allowing them to undertake their own inquiry. 'To 
be deprived of a valid claim of some €3.2m as a result of such reckless untruth is, in 
my view, a disproportionately harsh sanction.'
19
 Popplewell J would have favoured a 
rule that required 'a sufficiently close connection between the fraudulent device and 
the valid claim to make it just and proportionate that the valid claim should be 
forfeit.'
20
  
 
The Court of Appeal took a different view. Christopher Clarke LJ agreed that the 
fraudulent devices rule was draconian but believed it necessary as a 'deterrent to the 
deception of insurers who, in the nature of things, will have no, or very little, 
knowledge of the incident'.
21
 Removing the rule would encourage lying because the 
insured would have a one-way bet in that there would be an illegitimate gain if the lie 
succeeded and no loss if it failed. In any event, he noted that the Supreme Court had 
approved the fraudulent device rule (albeit in obiter) in Fairclough Homes Ltd v 
Summers .
22
  
 
Versloot Dredging in the Supreme Court 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal by a majority (4-1), ruling against 
the fraudulent devices rule by holding that the use of fraudulent devices does not 
amount to a fraudulent claim and so the claim is not forfeit. The consequence is that 
there is no longer a remedy where the insured has harnessed a fraudulent device to 
support its claim. While the appeal concerned a marine policy, Lord Hughes regarded 
its conclusions as applying to all insurance.
23
 The abolition of the rule is significant. 
Popplewell J had only argued for a materiality test that would have ‘permitted the 
court to look at whether it was just and proportionate to deprive the assured of his 
substantive rights’.24  
 
The majority took the view that this area was ready for (re)evaluation. Lord Hughes 
thought there was little support in the cases for the rule. The authorities were ‘scanty 
and equivocal’,25 and the issue had not been properly argued since The Aegeon, 
because most – or perhaps all – of the cases commonly believed to be about 
fraudulent devices were, in his opinion, really either fraudulent claims or breaches of 
the pre-contractual duty of disclosure.
26
 Lord Sumption noted that the fraudulent 
device rule had been applied by the Privy Council and endorsed by the Supreme 
Court,
27
 but thought there had been 'considerable judicial misgivings'.
28
 On the other 
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hand, in an opinion that shows the difficulties facing the common lawyer, Lord 
Mance, who unsurprisingly dissented, read the authorities rather differently, seeing in 
them ‘long-standing if limited authority’.29  
 
Lord Sumption signalled his intention by preferring 'collateral lie' to 'fraudulent 
device' and defining it as 'a lie which turns out when the facts are found to have no 
relevance to the insured's right to recover'.
30
 He accepted the fraudulent claims rule, 
but said, 'there are principled limits to the role which a claimant's immorality [here, 
the telling of the lie] can play in defeating his legitimate civil claims'.
31
 Those limits 
were breached by the proposition that the fraudulent claims rule included collateral 
lies.  
 
The insurance contract is a contract of indemnity under which the insurers promise to 
hold the indemnified person harmless against the loss, so that ‘once the loss is 
suffered... the indemnifier is in breach of contract for having failed to hold the 
indemnified person harmless against the relevant loss’.32 Does the use of a fraudulent 
device mean that an existing liability should be removed? Lord Sumption thought not. 
For him, there was a distinction between a fraudulently exaggerated claim, where the 
insured sought to obtain something to which there was no entitlement, and a collateral 
lie, where there was a genuine entitlement. In the latter situation, ‘the lie is dishonest, 
but the claim is not.’33  
 
He rejected Christopher Clarke LJ's argument that the collateral lie might lead the 
insurers to make irrelevant inquiries, pointing out that the objective of the fraudulent 
claims rule was to deter dishonestly exaggerated claims, not save the insurers from 
wasted effort. He also dismissed the idea that without the fraudulent devices rule the 
insured would be encouraged to lie by the one-way bet because, as the claim was 
genuine, the insured gained nothing and the insurers lost nothing.  
 
Lord Hughes observed that a collateral lie might still carry consequences, even if not 
those set out in The Aegeon. It could constitute contempt of court, although this is 
hard to see where the lie is irrelevant, and, as he admitted, prosecutions are rare. 
Similarly, he confessed that the possibility of the insurers obtaining damages for 
deceit was 'comparatively remote'.
34
 The policyholder might be required to disclose 
the lie in future applications for cover, which would make it difficult or more 
expensive to obtain cover, but, again, this seems unlikely if the lie was collateral so 
that the claim was not refused for fraud.
35
  More likely was his suggestion that the 
policyholder would find it difficult to convince the insurers or the court even when 
telling the truth about the claim. This may result in the insured being unable to prove 
the loss, and have an impact on the ability to obtain cover in the future from other 
insurers if they ask whether or not any claims have been refused. 
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31 n 1 above, at [36]. 
32 Firma C Trade S.A. v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association [1991] 2 AC 1, 35-36, Lord 
Goff. 
33 n 1 above, at [26]. 
34 ibid at [98]. 
35 Joseph Fielding Properties (Blackpool) Ltd v Aviva Insurance Ltd [2010] EWHC 2192 (QB). Also, 
would a later insurer discover there had been non-disclosure? 
 Counsel for the insurers in Versloot drew a parallel with pre-contractual disclosure, 
and suggested a connection between the lie and the claim existed where the lie was 
material to the merits of the claim as they appeared at the time it was uttered, even if 
all the facts were not known and, as in this case, turned out quite differently. Again, 
Lord Sumption disagreed. He thought there was a fundamental difference between the 
pre-contractual and the claims stages. The insurers have unlimited discretion when 
deciding whether to accept a risk and so needs all the facts, whereas the insurers are 
obliged to pay a claim that is covered by the policy and that liability depends on the 
facts as they were at the time of the loss, not as they appeared when the claim was 
made.  
 
Not surprisingly, Lord Mance dissented. Whereas the majority regarded the objective 
of the fraudulent claims rule as deterring fraudulent claims, he saw it more broadly as 
encouraging integrity in the claims process. He, therefore, did not distinguish 
fraudulent devices from dishonestly exaggerated claims - the lie made the genuine 
claim fraudulent.  
 
In the end the appeal turned on the majority's view that forfeiture of the claim for a 
collateral lie was unjustified. According to Lord Toulson, ‘the court must be guided 
by its own sense of what is just and appropriate. When all is said and done, that is the 
critical question on which the court is divided.’36 Lord Sumption thought that, ‘the 
moral character of the insured’s lie is in no way mitigated by the fact that it turns out 
to have been unnecessary. But there are principled limits to the role which a 
claimant’s immorality can play in defeating his legitimate civil claims.’37 For Lord 
Hughes extending the fraudulent claims rule was ‘too large a sledgehammer for the 
nut involved.’38 
 
there is plainly a difference of quality between the insured who deals 
fraudulently with his insurer in an attempt to gain something to which he is 
not entitled, and the insured who dishonestly gilds the lily with a lie or 
falsified evidence, but stands thereby to obtain nothing more than was his 
legal due.
39
 
 
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court's view that the insurers must pay in 
circumstances where the only reason not to do so is collateral to the claim echoes the 
approach taken by the Law Commissions in what is now section 11 of the Insurance 
Act 2015. As will be seen later, this provides that where the aim of a policy term is to 
reduce the insurers' risk and the term is breached, the insurers remain liable if the 
insured shows that the breach did not increase the risk of the loss that occurred.  
 
Of course, the facts in Versloot occurred before the Insurance Act 2015 came into 
effect on 12 August 2016. This statute deals only with remedies for fraudulent claims 
(s.12), but leaves the definition of that term to the common law, which means it does 
not include fraudulent devices. At common law it was unclear whether the insurers 
could terminate the contract and the effect on genuine claims arising after the fraud 
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but before its discovery. These issues were not addressed in Versloot, but it is likely 
that section 12, broadly, reflects the common law. Under this provision the insurers 
are not liable for the fraudulent claim (including genuine losses), may recover 
payments in respect of the claim, and can terminate the contract retrospectively from 
the time of the fraud, removing liability for subsequent genuine claims but not for 
those that arose before the fraud and were not connected to it.
40
 The act also provides 
that where a fraudulent claim is made in group insurance, section 12 applies as if the 
cover were provided under an individual policy between the insurers and the 
fraudulent claimant, so that the insurers’ rights under section 12 can only be exercised 
in relation to the cover provided for the fraudulent claimant and without any effect on 
anyone else (s.13(2)). 
 
 
MIGHT THE FRAUDULENT CLAIMS RULE RETURN? 
 
The judgment has received mixed reviews. There has been praise for the removal of a 
rule that some regarded as difficult to apply and harsh, but insurers, who feel besieged 
by fraudulent claims, have tended to be critical. Much of the criticism is based on a 
continued belief that the collateral lie taints the claim, irrespective of its original 
merits: 'an insured that lies may end up with his claim being paid without having 
genuinely produced that evidence.'
41
 James Dalton, of the Association of British 
Insurers, thought the decision ‘a blow for honest customers’, which ‘flies in the face 
of the work that the insurance industry and Government have been doing to crack 
down on the cheats and fraudsters.’42 In a rather familiar argument, he suggested 
premiums might increase because of the additional time taken to investigate claims, 
but his main concern was that ‘this decision sends consumers completely the wrong 
message: that lying to an insurer is somehow okay.’43  
 
Some difficulties do seem to arise from the decision. The lie is only collateral if it 
does not relate to the insurers' liability under the policy as this emerges when the facts 
are discovered, irrespective of the position at the time of the claim, but it will be 
difficult for the insurers to know whether the lie is collateral when most claims are 
settled without litigation - the fraudulent devices rule was simpler in this context 
because it only required proof of the lie. This may be exacerbated by the term implied 
into insurance contracts under the Enterprise Act 2016 which requires insurers to pay 
claims ‘within a reasonable time’.44  
 
But the impact of the decision on practice may have been overstated. It is for the 
insured to show that a loss has occurred and insurers will continue to refuse or reduce 
payments where a lie (irrespective of its relevance) casts doubts on the accuracy of 
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things the insured has said about the claim. Moreover, the critics forget that the 
uncertainty as to how the facts might be viewed by a court also operates on the honest 
insured and may pressure them to settle for a lower amount than the genuine loss.
45
  
 
Nevertheless, Lord Mance suggested that insurers might think about reintroducing the 
fraudulent devices rule:  
 
In the light of the majority judgment, insurers will no doubt be advised about 
whatever may be the potential merits of making express in future whatever 
understanding they have, or action they may wish to take, regarding the effect 
of fraudulent devices, as and when such are discovered to have been used by 
an insured during the claims process.
46
 
 
Indeed, as a result of Popplewell J's attack, some lawyers had already begun to advise 
insurers to insert such clauses.  
 
How is this to be achieved? At present not all policies contain terms excluding 
liability where there is a fraudulent device, and those that do reveal some drafting 
problems in the wake of Versloot. There is a condition precedent to liability in the 
Institute Hull Clauses 2003, 45.3, which states the assured shall not: 
 
knowingly or recklessly... mislead or attempt to mislead the Underwriters in 
the proper consideration of a claim or the settlement thereof by relying on any 
evidence which is false...[or] conceal any circumstance or matter from the 
Underwriters material to the proper consideration of a claim or a defence to 
such a claim.  
 
It cannot be argued that a collateral lie is material to a claim, and it seems implausible 
to suggest that the words ‘proper consideration of a claim’ revive the fraudulent 
devices rule. Another form of such a clause is, ‘If your claim is in any way dishonest 
or exaggerated we will not pay any benefit’.47 This would not seem to allow refusal of 
a claim for a collateral lie since ‘in any way dishonest’ refers to the claim and the 
claim is legitimate. In Joseph Fielding Properties (Blackpool) Ltd v Aviva Insurance 
Ltd,
48
 the policy read: 'We will at our option avoid the policy from the inception of 
this insurance or from the date of the claim or alleged claim or avoid the claim... [if] a 
false declaration or statement is made or fraudulent device put forward in support of a 
claim.'
49
 But this clause was titled 'Fraud' and is presumably confined to fraudulent 
claims since 'fraudulent device' has been emptied of meaning, or, at least, requires 
some definition to be provided by the policy which does not remove liability for 
covered losses. The same interpretation might be placed on a clause under which 
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benefits will be forfeited if the insured ‘engaged in any fraudulent conduct, or made 
any false statement relating to this insurance’.50 Household and other types of policy 
typically require the insured to produce proof of ownership, such as a receipt, but this 
merely restates the principle that it is for the claimant to prove the loss. A forged 
document may also mean the insurers are not liable because of a failure by the insured 
to comply with a condition precedent in the policy requiring notification of the loss, 
although, again, this does not reintroduce the fraudulent devices rule. 
 
The other difficulty is that under the Insurance Act 2015, section 15(1), a policy term 
will be of no effect if it puts ‘the consumer in a worse position as respects any of the 
matters' in section 12. That section provides remedies for fraudulent claims, and these 
do not now include fraudulent devices. In non-consumer insurance, section 11 states 
that where compliance with a term, other than a term defining the risk as a whole, 
would tend to reduce the risk of loss of a particular kind, or at a particular location, or 
at a particular time, the insurers will be liable if the insured shows that non-
compliance could not have increased the risk of the loss that occurred. The Law 
Commissions did not intend this to be confined simply to warranties, envisaging that 
it would apply to any term, including conditions precedent, so its precise scope will 
depend on the particular term. On a broad view it might, therefore, apply to a 
fraudulent device clause, but this seems unlikely since 'risk' in section 11 refers to the 
risk of the insured loss occurring, whereas a fraudulent device clause would 
presumably be designed to protect the insurers from having to pay in the event of the 
failure by the insured to follow a particular process, such as not submitting false 
documents. In any event, the policy may contract out of section 11 where the insurers 
have taken ‘sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the insured’s 
attention before the contract is entered into’ (s.17(2)), although that still leaves the 
difficulty of how to draft such a clause. 
 
FRAUD IN CLAIMS SETTLEMENTS: HAYWARD V ZURICH INSURANCE 
CO 
 
The other recent Supreme Court appeal on insurance fraud involved the settlement of 
a claim under an employer's liability policy where the third-party victim had 
dishonestly misrepresented the extent of his injuries. Of course, the insured - and, 
therefore, the insurers - are not liable where the claim is entirely fraudulent; but at 
common law the third-party victim was entitled to genuine losses, even if these had 
been accompanied by dishonest claims, because the courts refused to extend the 
fraudulent claims rule outside insurance contracts, and here the lie related to the 
settlement of damages for tort. The law has been changed. The Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015, section 57, obliges the court to dismiss a personal injury claim 
where the claimant has been 'fundamentally dishonest' in relation to his or her own 
claim, or a 'related claim', that is, in respect of a claim by another person arising from 
the same incident, except where this would produce 'substantial injustice'. Similarly, 
under qualified one-way costs shifting (Q.O.C.S.), a losing personal injury claimant is 
not liable for defence costs, except where 'the claim is found on the balance of 
probabilities to be fundamentally dishonest'.
51
 Requiring the dishonesty to be 
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51 Civil Procedure Rules 44.14 and 44.16(1). 
fundamental should mean fraudulent,
52
 although an early decision in the county court 
on Q.O.C.S. suggested the issue might depend on the proportion of the claim affected 
by the dishonesty by drawing a contrast between something that was merely 
'collateral' and something that went 'to the root of either the whole of his claim or a 
substantial part of his claim'.53  
 
Section 57 and Q.O.C.S. apply only where the claim concerns personal injury, and, 
while these are the bulk of liability claims, motor cases frequently involve property 
damage, so that, for this reason alone, other responses to fraud remain relevant. 
Section 57 followed the decision in Fairclough Homes Ltd v Summers,
54
 in which the 
Supreme Court noted that where fraud emerges before the trial and taints the entire 
claim, an application can be granted to strike out for abuse of process if the 
misconduct is so serious that it would be an affront to the court to permit the claim to 
continue, but in the end severely restricted its use.
55
 This case involved an application 
after the trial. S lied before and during the trial about the extent of injuries resulting 
from an accident at work, claiming around £800,000. The court accepted that the 
fraudulent claims rule applied only to insurance contracts,
56
 which meant that, in spite 
of S's dishonesty, he was awarded almost £89,000 for genuine injuries. The insurers, 
therefore, sought to avoid any liability by an application to strike out, and supported 
this with arguments similar to those used in support of the fraudulent claims rule, 
namely, that because fraud is commonplace the entire award should be forfeited as a 
deterrent.  
 
The Supreme Court held that a court could grant an application after the trial, but 
would only do so in a 'very exceptional case'
57
 where it was 'just and proportionate'.
58
 
The court agreed with Mummery L.J. when he said, in Masood v Zahoor,
59
 that such 
an application was meant to stop the waste of precious resources, and once the trial 
had been completed this purpose was gone. The court should, therefore, dismiss the 
claim, or make an award. Lord Clarke agreed on the need to take 'reasonable steps' to 
deter fraud, but 'there is a balance to be struck', and, 'To date the balance has been 
struck by assessing both liability and quantum'.
60
 S had been badly injured and the 
lies meant the court was unwilling to credit his evidence on other aspects of the claim 
with an inevitable effect on the amount awarded. Lord Clarke thought the reduction 
was 'just and proportionate'.  
 
The draconian step of striking a claim out is always a last resort, a fortiori 
where to do so would deprive the claimant of a substantive right to which the 
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court had held that he was entitled after a fair trial. It is very difficult indeed to 
think of circumstances in which such a conclusion would be proportionate.
61
 
 
Lord Clarke pointed out that the court could take other actions, such as reducing 
interest on any award for time wasted because of the fraud. He also strongly endorsed 
the idea of bringing proceedings for contempt, which would normally result in 
imprisonment.
62
 Insurers may, however, see no commercial benefit in what can be a 
complex and expensive task of gathering evidence. Lord Clarke said that a fraudulent 
claimant might be penalised by an award of costs - and, of course, this is allowed by 
Q.O.C.S., which was introduced after this case. Yet, although he thought 'the prospect 
of such orders is likely to be a real deterrent',
63
 the insurers may not be able to enforce 
a costs award because the individual is unlikely to have sufficient resources (unless 
there is a damages award), and any conditional fee agreement will not cover fraud. 
Lord Clarke made little of these difficulties, concluding: 'It ... seems to us that it is in 
principle more appropriate to penalise such a claimant as a contemnor than to relieve 
the defendant of what the court has held to be a substantive liability.'
64
 While the 
passing of section 57 shows that, at least in regard to personal injury claims, this was 
not the view taken by Parliament, Lord Clarke's remarks do highlight an issue that is 
often unacknowledged in the discussion of fraudulent claims: dismissing the claim for 
fraud means the defendant is excused from its contractual obligations, or, where the 
insurers stand behind a tortfeasor, the wrongdoer's tortious liability.  
 
The Supreme Court issued judgment in the most recent case on fraud in settlements a 
mere seven days after Versloot. In Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co plc,
65
 H claimed 
£420,000 following a back injury at work. The employer's liability insurers, Z, did not 
dispute the injury but had suspicions about its extent, and yet they settled - albeit for 
just under £135,000 - because they were not confident that there was sufficient 
evidence to convince a court. Six years later, further evidence emerged that H had 
exaggerated his injuries. Z sought to recover the payment, set aside the settlement and 
obtain damages for deceit. The trial judge set the settlement aside, but awarded H 
£14,720 because the fraudulent misrepresentation only rescinded the settlement and 
did not remove the right to damages. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and 
reinstated the original settlement. Although the judges expressed some reluctance, 
they thought there was no authority for the view taken by the trial judge, and they 
gave priority to the public policy interest in encouraging settlements above that of 
deterring fraud.  
 
The Supreme Court overturned this decision. Lord Clarke remarked:  
 
I am not persuaded that the importance of encouraging settlement, which I 
entirely agree is considerable, is sufficient to allow Mr Hayward to retain 
moneys which he only obtained by fraud.
66
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The insurers need not show they were induced to enter into the settlement because 
they believed the representations were true. It is sufficient that the misrepresentation 
was a material cause of Z entering the agreement. Although doubting H, Z took the 
reasonable view that a judge might believe him. The false representation was intended 
to influence the insurers, ‘not necessarily by causing them to believe him, but by 
causing them to value his litigation claim more highly than it was worth’.67 Z did not 
have all the facts and acted to its detriment. Lord Clarke could not ‘envisage any 
circumstance in which mere suspicion that a claim was fraudulent would preclude 
unravelling a settlement when fraud is subsequently established.’68 Once the 
representation has been shown to be fraudulent, it is for the claimant to show it played 
no material part in the insurers’ decision to settle, which will be difficult.  
 
The decision has been generally welcomed by the insurance industry, although there 
has been concern that it might encourage multiple attempts to reopen settlement 
agreements where the insurers, for whatever reason, have become fixated on the idea 
that the claimant is fraudulent.
69
 Insurers might use this threat to harass claimants, but 
the court in Hayward clearly intended that settlements should be inviolable unless 
fraud could be shown and that is no easy task. This still leaves the difficulty of 
determining when the settlement can be challenged. Lies tend to come not singly but 
in battalions. If the insurers are aware of a fraud, such as the exaggeration of an 
injury, but decide to pay because of their view that, in spite of the lie, public 
sympathy will be with the victim (or, where the insured is a major brand, concern 
over its reputation may create pressure to settle), can the settlement be reopened if a 
different lie is discovered of which the insurers knew nothing at the time? 
Presumably, the court would allow this because the representations are looked at 
separately. There might be an argument that there was no reliance because the 
insurers were willing to pay, irrespective of fraud, although, perhaps, the 
accumulation of frauds would make a difference.  
 
 
THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL LAW IN FRAUD 
 
Insurance fraud has received a lot of attention in the last few years. There have been 
high-level inquiries, including the Insurance Fraud Taskforce, which reported in 
2016,
70
 and the industry funds a fraud unit within the City of London Police. In 
Versloot and Hayward, the Supreme Court endorsed the fraudulent claims rule, as did 
the English and Scottish Law Commissions and Parliament in the Insurance Act 2015, 
and the approach taken in that rule has been extended by the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015.  
 
The justification of the fraudulent claims rule is straightforward:  
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It is important for the law to set out clear sanctions to deter policyholders from 
acting fraudulently. Although insurance fraud is a criminal offence, 
prosecutions are relatively rare, meaning that the civil law has an important 
part to play in deterring fraud
71
 
 
If the insurers are not liable for losses that have not actually occurred or for 
exaggerated claims, irrespective of the honesty of the claimant, forfeiture of the 
genuine parts of the claim where there has been fraud amounts to punishment. This is 
inflicted primarily for the purpose of what criminologists call general deterrence, 
which means the decision about punishment is detached from the particular offence 
and people are punished to deter others. The lack of any evidence that such penalties 
are effective in deterring fraud did not greatly trouble the Law Commissions or the 
Supreme Court, even though this means the penalty becomes retributive. The issue 
was raised by counsel for the insurers during argument in Versloot, but the judges 
seemed to regard it as largely beyond discussion because of Parliament's endorsement 
of the fraudulent claims rule in the Insurance Act 2015, section 12.
72
 In any event, 
Lord Sumption remarked: 
 
Courts are rarely in a position to assess empirically the wider behavioural 
consequences of legal rules, the formation of legal policy in this as in other 
areas depends mainly on the vindication of collective moral values and on 
judicial instincts about the motivation of rational beings, not on the scientific 
anthropology of fraud or underwriting.
73
 
 
This might be said to allow unscientific justifications - hunches. This works both 
ways. Lord Toulson rejected the argument put forward by the insurers that removing 
the fraudulent devices rule would affect behaviour by simply saying, 'I am sceptical 
about the idea that knowledge of this judgment will incentivise people with valid 
insurance claims to lie in support of their claims.'
74
 
 
The other issue is whether imposing punishment for the purpose of general deterrence 
a proper objective for the civil law. Presumably, the deficiency in the criminal law, 
which the Law Commissions highlighted,
75
 is that there is not enough evidence to 
prosecute, so that the only way to punish those who are supposedly guilty of fraud is 
by applying the lower standard of proof used in the civil law. Popplewell J criticised 
the fraudulent claims rule as 'a form of penal non-damages', although, in part, this was 
because it had 'no parallel elsewhere in the common law.'
76
 This awareness of the 
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unique nature of the rule did underpin the Supreme Court's decision to limit its scope 
because, as Lord Sumption put it, 'the law of insurance is concerned more with 
controlling the impact of a breach of good faith on the risk than with the punishment 
of misconduct.'
77
 The proper role of the civil law was also considered in another 
appeal decided in a very busy July 2016 when the Supreme Court allowed the 
restitution of funds advanced for an illegal purpose that had never been carried out. 
Lord Neuberger said, 'it is for the criminal law, not the civil law, to penalise a party or 
parties for entering into and/or performing a contract with an illegal component.'
78
 
Lord Sumption agreed: ‘although rules of civil law might have a punitive effect, this 
was no part of their purpose.’79 Doubtless, the fraudulent claims rule was fresh in his 
mind because he was careful to add that there were limited exceptions to this general 
principle.  
 
While the Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of the fraudulent claims rule, 
this rule (or its siblings) has made advances elsewhere. In Hayward, the aim of 
deterring fraud was given priority over the public interest in finalising settlements; the 
Insurance Act 2015 cemented in place, and, arguably extended, the remedies for 
insurance fraud; and the Criminal Justice and Courts Act established a quasi-
fraudulent claims rule in all personal injuries cases. Why, one might ask, stop there? 
Yet, even if one ignores problems with the figures used to support assertions about the 
increase in insurance fraud,
80
 there remains the blurring of the boundary between the 
civil law and the criminal law. Of course, any criticism of a tougher line on fraud 
might seem ill placed and is not likely to be well received in insurance or law 
enforcement circles, but it is surely worth pausing to consider whether it is 
appropriate to use the civil law to impose what are in effect fines (the loss of genuine 
claims) without being required to prove the facts beyond all reasonable doubt because 
of the ease with which such penalties may be rolled out into other areas. 
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